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  This paper extends first-best analysis of anti-sprawl policies, such as development taxes, and 
examines the welfare effects of development taxes in the presence of urban decline at the city 
core. We find that anti-sprawl policies generate several important feedbacks within the urban 
system, generating additional welfare gains and affecting the level of urban decline and subur-
ban sprawl. Further, the optimal development tax exceeds the (first-best) Pigouvian level, irre-
spective of whether or not revenues are returned lump-sum to all landowners or earmarked for 
urban decline mitigation. 
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Two trends characterize the evolution of metro-
politan areas in the United States. Many central 
cities of major metropolitan areas are in decline 
relative to the suburbs, and at the same time, met-
ropolitan areas are also experiencing rapid devel-
opment in their outer suburban areas.
1 
  Some argue that this pattern of land develop-
ment is inefficient, leading to losses of open space, 
excessive commuting, increases in the cost of 
providing public services, civic disengagement, 
and even obesity.
2 Market failures including un-
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1 There is a growing body of literature on the economics of urban 
sprawl surveyed in Glaeser and Khan (2004) and Nechyba and Walsh 
(2004). For important contributions to the modeling of the causes of 
sprawl, see Brueckner (2000), Cheshire and Sheppard (2002, 2003), 
Burchfield et al. (2006), Wu (2006), and Irwin and Bockstael (2007). 
2 Wu and Plantinga (2003) examined the effects of public open space 
policies on urban spatial structure. Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz 
dervaluation of open space at the urban fringe, 
unpriced traffic congestion, and underpriced urban 
infrastructures have been identified as causes of 
urban sprawl (Brueckner 2000). As a consequence, 
policymakers, urban planners, and public policy 
analysts have called for more stringent policies to 
strengthen the urban core and to discourage sub-
urbanization. 
  Economists have often advocated for market-
based instruments, such as development taxes, to 
curb urban sprawl.
3 As argued in Brueckner 
(2001) and Bento, Franco, and Kaffine (2006), if 
the only market failure leading to urban sprawl is 
undervaluation of open space at the urban fringe, 
then the social optimum can be achieved either by 
a development tax equal to vacant land’s amenity 
value per acre, or by an urban growth boundary 
(UGB) set at the appropriate distance from the ur-
ban center. 
  However, the presence of additional urban spa-
tial market failures can potentially alter this stan-
dard Pigouvian prescription. For example, urban 
decline can generate negative spillovers on adja-
                                                                                    
(2003) estimate the value of open space on neighboring residential 
areas. Bento et al. (2005) examined the impacts of sprawl on vehicle 
ownership, vehicle miles traveled, and public transit ridership. Plant-
inga and Bernell (2007) and Eid et al. (2008) examined the link be-
tween urban sprawl and obesity. Brueckner and Largey (2008) exam-
ined the links between urban sprawl, social interactions, and neighbor-
hood density. 
3 Recently, Banzhaf and Lavery (2010) have confirmed that develop-
ment taxes can be an effective tool to curb urban sprawl. In particular, 
the authors find empirical evidence that the adoption of a split-rate tax 
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cent areas (Ellen et al. 2003) and potentially af-
fect suburban sprawl. In addition, anti-sprawl 
policies can affect landowners’ private decisions 
to mitigate central city decline. Anti-sprawl poli-
cies can shift population towards the city center, 
increasing housing demand and central city hous-
ing prices and, thus, increasing reinvestment 
incentives (Brueckner and Helsley 2011). In ad-
dition, some anti-sprawl policies such as devel-
opment taxes also generate revenues that can be 
recycled into declined areas of the city, influenc-
ing individual reinvestment efforts (Bento, Franco, 
and Kaffine 2009). The importance of these feed-
back effects and their impacts on the welfare ef-
fects of development taxes has been typically 
overlooked in the urban sprawl literature. Our 
goal here is to fill this important gap in the 
literature. 
  To inform policymakers engaged in setting 
anti-sprawl policies, this paper answers three key 
questions. First, what are the welfare effects of 
development taxes in the presence of urban de-
cline at the city core? Second, how should the 
optimal development tax be set when there are 
empirically important interactions between urban 
decline and anti-sprawl policies? A related issue 
is how this (second-best) development tax com-
pares to the (first-best) Pigouvian level. Third, 
can a development tax be justified even when the 
benefits of open space are negligible? In other 
words, should an anti-sprawl policy be part of the 
local tax system, even if there are uncertainties on 
the magnitude of the direct benefits of anti-sprawl 
policies? 
  The framework used to answer these questions 
follows closely that of Bento, Franco, and Kaffine 
(2009, 2011). Specifically, we develop a spatially 
explicit monocentric circular open city model 
with two market distortions that affect develop-
ment decisions at the urban fringe: under valua-
tion of open space at the urban fringe, and urban 
decline at the city core that potentially affects 
development at the urban fringe. We define urban 
sprawl as an excessive outward expansion of ur-
ban development relative to what is socially effi-
cient, and we define urban decline as spatial con-
centration of deficient housing maintenance or re-
investment.
4 
                                                                                    
4 In our model, urban decline arises from the interaction of neighbor-
hood externalities that influence individual maintenance or reinvest- 
  Our framework captures an important empirical 
regularity that suggests that the presence of urban 
decline at the city core potentially affects devel-
opment at the urban fringe.
5 As shown in Brueck-
ner and Helsley (2011), the interactions between 
the city core and suburbs can generate additional 
spillovers that promote suburban sprawl and ur-
ban decline. In their closed city framework, urban 
decline increases the desirability of suburban lo-
cations, thereby increasing urban sprawl. How-
ever, it is also known that severe urban decline 
has strong negative spillover effects on other prop-
erties within a city (Santiago, Galster, and Tatian 
2001, Ellen et al. 2003, Schwartz et al. 2006, 
Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens 2009), which 
may also decrease the competitiveness of a par-
ticular metropolitan area in attracting households 
and businesses.
6 In this latter scenario, competi-
tion for residents between central cities and sub-
urban areas is less fierce, and urban decline can 
even lead to a decrease in urban sprawl. The de-
cline of central cities can affect an entire metro-
politan region negatively through amenities, ag-
glomeration economies (benefits that firms get 
from locating near each other), and social prob-
lems. When a central city is declining—i.e., ex-
periencing negative population growth and a de-
teriorating tax base due to a flight for the sub-
urbs—the amenities that it can offer its residents 
                                                                                    
ment decisions. The process fueling spillovers throughout the urban 
area begins with the presence of urban decline at the center. However, 
the impacts on the metropolitan area development would have been the 
same had urban decline been located at the urban fringe. In our con-
text, the presence of urban decline, independent of its geographical lo-
cation, alters the pattern of metropolitan investment, therefore reducing 
the city’s capacity to pursue goals such as competitiveness. 
5 In related work, Anas and Rhee (2006) provide a numerical ap-
praisal of congestion tolls and UGBs in a city that is congested, but 
their framework differs substantially from the standard monocentric 
model. Brueckner (2007) re-examined the effectiveness of UGBs as 
second-best instruments in a monocentric congested city. In the most 
closely related work, Brueckner and Helsley (2011) consider both ur-
ban decline and urban sprawl; however, it should be noted that in their 
treatment, links between urban decline and urban sprawl are generated 
by competition between suburban and urban properties for a fixed 
number of residents. In our open city framework, the number of resi-
dents is endogenous. 
6 Albouy (2008) uses a Rosen-Roback framework to generate city-
level rankings of quality of life and to infer the value to consumers of 
various local public goods and city characteristics. The estimates show 
that households have a high willingness to pay (WTP) to live in places 
with many eating and drinking establishments, and arts and culture. To 
the extent that density correlates with supporting public goods like arts 
and culture, then the increases in density due to urban decline mitiga-
tion could generate city-wide increases in utility, and make the city 
more attractive to residents.  Bento, Franco, and Kaffine  Welfare Effects of Anti-Sprawl Policies in the Presence of Urban Decline   441 
 
 
diminish as well. But this is not only a problem 
for the city in question since some of these ameni-
ties (cultural institutions, vibrant pedestrian dis-
tricts, waterfront parks, libraries, etc.), although 
tied to a single locality, are valued by an entire 
region. When a continuous outflow of residents 
from the urban core hinders the declining com-
munity from providing basic public services and 
regional amenities such as these, it ends up mak-
ing the entire metro area less desirable. Part of the 
allure of a New York City suburb is that it is right 
outside New York, while a precious few, if any, 
move to the Detroit metro area because of what 
Motown can offer.
7 
  This link between urban decline and sprawl 
provides a potential rationale for recycling reve-
nues of development taxes through a subsidy to 
housing improvements. Below, when evaluating 
the welfare effects of development taxes, we con-
trast this form of revenue-recycling with a stan-
dard recycling scheme where all revenues are 
lump-sum redistributed to landowners. 
  We find that when revenues from the develop-
ment tax are returned lump sum, the welfare ef-
fects of this policy can be decomposed into two 
main channels. The first is the traditional Pigou-
vian welfare effect, which is the efficiency gain 
associated with households responding to the 
higher level of open space by increasing their 
bids for housing, net of the cost associated with 
the reduction in the total amount of land devel-
oped at the urban fringe. Second, by increasing 
bid rents throughout the city, private housing im-
provements are stimulated, leading to an addi-
tional welfare channel, the aggregate improve-
ment effect. This represents the efficiency gain 
from capitalization of urban decline mitigation. 
  In contrast, when development tax revenues are 
recycled in the form of housing improvement 
subsidies, an additional welfare channel emerges: 
the revenue-recycling effect. By subsidizing pri-
vate mitigation of urban decline, additional wel-
fare changes arise from capitalization of these 
improvements. As a result of the aggregate im-
provement effect and revenue-recycling effect, the 
optimal development tax should be set higher 
than the Pigouvian level. In fact, when revenues 
                                                                                    
7 In addition, when central cities experience urban decline, agglom-
eration economies follow suit. Individual firms that benefit from these 
may then pick up their operations and relocate to another area that 
offers stronger network effects. 
are recycled to subsidize housing improvements, 
a positive development tax may be justified even 
when household valuation of open space is negli-
gible. 
  We also illustrate that feedbacks between anti-
sprawl policies and urban decline can affect the 
level of suburbanization. In the case where the 
revenues from the development tax are returned 
lump-sum, mitigation of urban decline induced by 
the increase in open space creates a feedback ef-
fect, potentially increasing development pressure 
at the urban boundary. This occurs because the 
attractiveness of an urban area increases when the 
amount of open space near the urban area in-
creases and the level of urban decline decreases, 
thereby attracting more population into the area. 
Achieving a given reduction in the level of sub-
urbanization thus requires a larger development 
tax than the case when these feedback effects are 
absent. These feedback effects are further in-
creased when development tax revenues are re-
cycled in the form of housing improvement subsi-
dies. In fact, the city boundary may even increase 
when revenues are recycled. This suggests that 
policymakers interested in curbing suburban sprawl 
must be mindful of potential feedbacks through-
out the urban system that can affect development 
decisions at the urban boundary and the distribu-
tion of the population across space. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Next we introduce the analytical model and as-
sumptions. Then we decompose the welfare ef-
fects of the development tax, the corresponding 
changes in open space, and the optimal develop-




The analytical framework presented here follows 
closely that of Bento, Franco, and Kaffine (2009, 
2011). There are two market failures in the model: 
under-priced open space amenities at the urban 




The city is circular, open, and monocentric, with 
a predetermined urban center—the CBD—on a fea-
tureless plane with no topographical and regula-
tory constraints. Two competing land uses are 
possible in the city: agriculture and residential 442    December 2011  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
use. Land is owned by absentee landowners. Both 
land and the housing markets are competitive. 
Each parcel of land is sold to the highest bidder 
and housing is supplied to the household bidding 
the highest amount. The presence of the external-
ities discussed below implies that the resulting 
laissez-faire equilibrium will not be economically 
efficient. 
 
Open Space Amenities 
 
Land in agricultural use, Ag, generates an exoge-
nous rent ra, as well as open space amenities. The 
total amount of agricultural land is given by 
 
(1) 
22 () Agm x =π − , 
 
where m is the exogenous geographical boundary 
of the total amount of land that can be allocated to 
residential use and agriculture, and  x  is the city 
boundary—that is, the endogenous border be-
tween agriculture and residential use. 
  For simplicity, we assume that open space 
amenities, O, are linear in the amount of land al-
located to agricultural use: 
 
(2) 




Each household enjoys utility from housing (H), 
a composite consumption good (Z), and open space 
amenities around the city (O), and is adversely 
affected by the level of urban decline in the city 
center [D(x)].
8 The household utility function is 
represented by: 
 
(3)  () [, , , ( ) ] Uu H ZO D x, 
 
                                                                                    
8 Note that the effects of urban decline are allowed to vary with 
location x but the benefits of open space at the urban fringe accrue ho-
mogenously to households living throughout the city. While empirical 
studies have noted that the valuation of open space depends on its total 
amount and accessibility (e.g., Anderson and West 2006, Irwin 2002, 
Geoghegan 2002, Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz 2003, McConnell 
and Walls 2005), explicitly modeling the spatial amenities of open 
space would make the analysis more cumbersome without changing 
our analytical results, and as such we have abstracted from such spatial 
considerations. 
where  U(⋅) is continuous, quasi-concave, and 
weakly separable in u(⋅), O, and D(x).
9 The house-
hold budget constraint is given by Z + pH = y–tx, 
where p is the rental price of H, y is household 
income, t is the transportation cost per mile, and x 
is distance, in miles, from the place of residence 
to the place of work. For simplicity, we set the 
price of the composite good equal to unity. 
 Households  choose  x,  Z, and H to maximize 
utility (3) subject to the budget constraint, taking 
the level of open space and urban decline as 
given. From the resulting first-order conditions 
we obtain the uncompensated demand functions 
for the composite good and housing, conditional 
on  x:  Z(y–tx,  p) and H(y–tx,  p). Substituting 
these equations into (3) gives the indirect utility 
function: 
 
(4)  [, , , ( ) ] Vy t xpODx − . 
 
For any given structure of housing prices in the 
city, households prefer those locations that pro-
vide the highest level of utility. In equilibrium, 
the usual spatial arbitrage argument implies that 
all locations that are occupied by households must 
have rents that allow a common level of utility V  
to be achieved. Therefore, a representative house-
hold chooses x that maximizes (4), and p adjusts 
so that 
 
(5)  [, , , ( ) ] Vyt x p O D x V − = . 
 
Equation (5) implicitly defines the housing bid 
rent function as 
 
(6)  [, , ( ) , ] pyt x O D xV − . 
 
Equation (6) describes the maximum rent per unit 
floor area that a household is willing to pay at 
distance x from the CBD if it is to receive a given 
level of utility V . It is important to observe that 
the levels of open space and urban decline affect 
equilibrium prices (housing rents) and, ultimately, 
the levels of housing density. 
 
                                                                                    
9 The separability restriction implies that the demands for H and Z do 
not vary directly with changes in O and D(x), though it should be 
noted that these demands can vary indirectly through price feedbacks. 
This is a common simplifying assumption. Using a more general utility 
function would not affect the key results. Bento, Franco, and Kaffine  Welfare Effects of Anti-Sprawl Policies in the Presence of Urban Decline   443 
 
 
Housing Supply and Housing Quality 
 
Housing floor space is produced with land and 
capital according to a strictly concave, constant-
returns production function. The intensive form 
of the production function is given by the con-
cave function h[S(x)], where S(x) is capital per 
unit of land (structural density) at location x. Con-
struction costs C
S[S(x)] are a continuous convex 
function. 
  We assume that there are two components of 
decline at each location x, D(x): the quality of the 
local housing stock, Q(x), and the aggregate 
quality of the housing stock, A, such that D(x) = 
D[Q(x), A] and DQ < 0, DA < 0. 
  The quality of the local housing stock is de-
fined as 
 
(7)  () () () Qx Q x Ix =− δ + , 
 
where δ(x) is an exogenous level of physical de-
terioration of the housing stock at location x, and 
I(x) is the level of housing improvements that 
landowners can choose to undertake.
10  Q  repre-
sents the “maximum” housing stock quality, with 
no deterioration or needed improvements. Let  D x  
represent the exogenous boundary of houses 
exhibiting physical deterioration, and assume that 
housing locations  D x xx <<  exhibit some level 
of physical deterioration, while houses near the 
urban boundary do not. According to (7), the 
quality of the housing stock near the CBD can be 
fully or partially offset by housing improve-
ments:0( )( ) I xx ≤≤ δ . Total improvements are 






II x x d x =π ∫ . 
 
 Housing improvement costs are given by 
C
I[S(x), I(x)], which is continuous and convex. 
The aggregate quality of the city’s housing stock 
in the current period is thus represented by 
 
                                                                                    
10 Our analysis uses a static framework, and thus for simplicity we 
have not modeled the dynamic process that has led to the deterioration 
of the housing stock in the current period. Reasons for the presence of 
housing deterioration in a certain period include housing durability 
(Glaeser and Gyourko 2005), construction costs (Gyourko and Saiz 
2003), and externalities from individual behaviors (Kutty 1995). 
(9)   
00
() 2 [ () ] 2
DD xx
A Qx x d x Q x x d x I = π= − δ π+ ∫∫ , 
 
where  x  is the (endogenous) city boundary. Thus, 
improvements made at a given location, I(x), 
increase the local quality of the housing stock, 
Q(x), which also increases the aggregate quality 
of the housing stock, A. This increase in ag-
gregate housing quality is in turn capitalized into 
housing prices across the city per equation (6). 
Specifically, local housing improvements are 











and aggregate housing improvements are capital-













The return per acre of land in residential use at a 
particular location x  is defined from the zero 
profit condition as 
 
(10)  
() ,() (, ) m ax [ , , ( ), ] [ ( )]
          [ ( )] [ ( ), ( )].
IxSx
SI
rx p yt x O D x V h S x





A landowner at location x chooses the level of 
structural density, S(x), and the level of housing 
improvements,  I(x), taking into account (7), in 
order to maximize (10).
11 If the exogenous return 
in agriculture, ra, is less than the return in resi-
dential use, r(⋅,x), land is converted into residen-
tial use. From this maximization problem we ob-
tain the optimal structural density and the optimal 
level of improvements, respectively, as 
 
(11a) 
*[, , ( ) , , ] 0 Syt x O xI V − δ≥  and 
 
(11b) 
*[, , ( ) , , ] 0 Iyt x O xI V − δ≥ . 
 
                                                                                    
11 See the appendix for first-order conditions of the maximization 
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Equations (11a) and (11b) highlight several im-
portant features of the model. Because housing 
bid rents capitalize housing quality, structural 
density and private improvements depend on both 
the (exogenous) physical deterioration of the local 
housing stock δ(x) and aggregate housing im-
provements  I . In addition, because changes in 
open space O are capitalized into housing prices, 






The urban equilibrium is determined by two con-
ditions. First, residential land rent must equal the 
agricultural rent ra at the city boundary,  x : 
 
(12)  (, , , ) a ry t xOIV r −= . 
 
The city boundary,  x , is established in the land 
market and is implicitly determined by (12) as 
 
(13)  (,, ,, , ) a x ytOIVr . 
 
From (2), the total amount of open space ameni-
ties is implicitly given by 
 
(14) 
22 [( , , , , , ) ] a Om x y t O I V r =π − . 
 
  The second urban equilibrium condition deter-
mines how many residents, N, the city accommo-
dates: 
                                                                                    
12 Note that the improvements decision by a single landowner depends 
on the improvements of all other landowners. This interdependence of 
improvement choices implies that they form a Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium in which each landlord chooses an improvement level that is the 
best response to the improvements chosen by his neighbors. To ensure 



























Ioannides and Zabel (2003) and Ioannides (2002) provide evidence 
that neighbors’ decisions to maintain, repair, renovate, or make addi-
tions to their home induce other individuals to increase their own re-
pairs, maintenance, and renovations. 
(15)      
0
([ , ,() ,, ] )
2
[, , ( ) , , ]
x hSy t xO x IV
xdx N





  where 
 
  
([ , ,() ,, ] )
[, , ( ) , , ]
hSy t xO x IV





is the population density at x miles from the CBD, 
which is the ratio between square feet of floor 
space per acre of land and square feet of floor 
space per dwelling. 
  Equation (15) shows that in a circular city, all 
households must find a house somewhere within 
a radius  x , the city boundary. Because the city is 
open, costless migration ensures that the urban 
households are neither better off nor worse off 
than households in the rest of the urban economy. 
In this case, the urban utility level is fixed exoge-
nously, and population N  becomes endogenous, 
adjusting to whatever value is consistent with the 
prevailing utility level, V . 
  We can now formally define the equilibrium. 
An urban land-use equilibrium in a monocentric, 
circular, and open city with absentee landowners 
is a vector (, ) x N  such that (14) and (15) are 
satisfied. 
 
Spillovers and Urban Sprawl 
 
While an undervaluation of open space leads to 
urban sprawl and thus an expansion in  x , a de-
crease in aggregate housing improvements  I  
may reduce urban sprawl.
13 Negative spillovers 
from urban decline decrease the value of residen-
tial land at the city boundary [left-hand side of 
(12)], thereby reducing the size of the city,  x .
14 
                                                                                    
13 Open space provides many potential public goods with aesthetic, 
recreation, and biodiversity values. It also offers associated ecosystem 
services such as flood control and water purification. Because the pri-
vate land market does not recognize these public goods, the private 
cost of converting land from agriculture to residential use [the right-
hand side of (12)] is lower than the social cost, leading to too much 
development at the fringe. 
14 In addition, 







implies that housing improvements are underprovided from the per-
spective of residents at the city boundary, and would thus benefit from 
marginal increases in housing improvements. As a result, subsidies for  Bento, Franco, and Kaffine  Welfare Effects of Anti-Sprawl Policies in the Presence of Urban Decline   445 
 
 
Given these two countervailing forces, the net ef-
fect on urban sprawl is ambiguous. If the market 
failure of undervaluation of open space is strong 
enough to overcome the negative spillovers from 
urban decline, sprawl occurs. 
  From a policy perspective, one implication of 
our results is that it may not be true that a policy 
aimed at reducing urban decline can decrease the 
size of a city. Furthermore, from (11) any anti-
sprawl policy that saves open space at the urban 
boundary also influences housing improvements 
at the city core through bid rents, which in turn 
feed back into city size. Below, we further ex-
plore the implication of these spillover and feed-
back effects on the welfare effects of an anti-
sprawl development tax. 
 
 




To calculate the efficiency impacts of a policy in-
tervention, we note that prior to a policy interven-
tion, total value of land in the city, R, is given by 
the total value of land in residential use plus total 








R r x xdx r xdx =⋅π+ π ∫∫ , 
 
where  m denotes the geographic extent of poten-
tially developable land. The efficiency impacts of 
a policy are calculated as changes in the value of 
land resulting from the policy intervention net of 
any changes in government transfers. 
 
__________________________________________ 
housing improvements would provide benefits that span the metropoli-
tan area. By contrast, if 








this would suggest that increases in housing improvements in the city 
center would reduce the demand for land near the city boundary. This 
would be consistent with competition between cities and suburbs for 
households, and would imply that subsidies for housing improvements 
reduce the demand for land in the suburbs. Finally, if 








suburban land values are independent of housing investments at the 
city center. 
  For the policies considered below, a develop-
ment tax τD per unit of residential land is im-
posed. Such a tax will reduce the city boundary, 
curbing urban sprawl and increasing open space—
formally, from (14), 
 









Development Tax with Revenues Returned Lump-
Sum to All Landowners 
 
First consider the welfare effects of a develop-
ment tax τD with revenue returned lump-sum g to 
all landowners. The efficiency effects of a mar-

















hS x d x
dO d
pd I d O
hS x d x
Id O d
⎡⎤ ∂












(see appendix for derivation), where the change 






















  Equation (17) decomposes the welfare effect of 
the development tax into two main components. 
The term denoted W
P represents the traditional 
Pigouvian welfare effect associated with land-
owners responding to the development tax by re-
ducing the amount of land developed at the 
boundary of the city. This effect equals the in-
crease in open space multiplied by the wedge be-
tween the development tax and the marginal 
external benefit of open space. This term is analo-
gous to the welfare effects derived in Bento, Franco, 
and Kaffine (2006) for a development tax or an 
urban growth boundary in the absence of urban 
decline. 
  In addition to this effect, an additional welfare 
gain occurs through the aggregate improvements 
effect, denoted W
I. By increasing open space pro-446    December 2011  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
vision, bid rents increase, which in turn increases 
private improvements. By the envelope theorem, 
private improvements disappear from the welfare 
formula; however, the benefits of aggregate im-
provements are capitalized into housing prices, 
generating the additional welfare effect. Note that 
this additional effect implies that the optimal de-
velopment tax should be set higher than the Pig-













∂∂ ∫ . 
 
Although improvements generate an additional 
welfare effect, this effect implicitly depends on 
households’ value of open space. As such, if house-
holds’ valuation of open space is negligible, the 
optimal development tax will be equal to zero in 
the case of lump-sum returned revenues. 
  The presence of urban decline generates an 
additional effect, as shown in equation (18). By 
stimulating improvements, the policy can increase 
housing bid rents at the urban boundary, leading 
to a decrease in the level of open space generated 
by the development tax. This feedback from the 
mitigation of urban decline implies that a larger 
development tax is required to achieve a given 
reduction in suburban sprawl relative to the case 
where these feedbacks are absent. 
 
Development Tax with Improvements Subsidy 
 
Now consider the welfare effects of a develop-
ment tax τD with revenues from this tax ear-
marked to fund subsidies g to improvements.
15 
The efficiency effects of a marginal increase in τD 











hS x d x
dO d
⎡⎤ ∂




                                                                                    
15 A land tax (such as the development tax) is a logical source of 
revenue for urban policy, as it is less distortionary than other revenue 
sources such as a property tax (Bento, Franco, and Kaffine 2011). Con-
sidering development taxes and how development tax revenue is used 
is important, particularly when anti-sprawl objectives can be amplified 
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(see appendix for derivation), where the change 




















  Comparing equation (20) with (17), the devel-
opment tax with revenues recycled to subsidize 
improvements exploits the same Pigouvian wel-
fare effect W
P and aggregate improvements effect 
W
I channels as the case of a development tax with 
revenues returned lump-sum. However, an addi-
tional welfare effect appears in the form of the 
revenue-recycling effect, denoted W
R. This wel-
fare channel represents the net welfare effect as-
sociated with recycling the revenues from the 
development tax to subsidize improvements. The 
first term represents the marginal social benefits 
of subsidized aggregate improvements capitalized 
into housing prices. The second term is simply 
the cost of improvements. 
  Thus, if the marginal social benefits of improve-
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revenues should be lump-sum returned. If the 
marginal social benefits of improvements do ex-
ceed the marginal cost, this also implies that the 
development tax should be set at a higher level to 
capture the revenue-recycling benefits associated 
with subsidizing improvements. The optimal tax 
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In contrast with lump-sum revenue recycling, 
when revenues are used to subsidize improve-
ments, a positive development tax may be justi-
fied even if household valuation of open space is 
negligible. In other words, the development tax 
should be part of the optimal local tax system. 
  Finally, it should be noted that subsidizing 
improvements also affects suburban sprawl, as 
shown in equation (21). By allocating revenue to 
mitigate urban decline, bid rents throughout the 
city increase, increasing development pressure at 
the city boundary and resulting in less open space. 
Thus, when revenues are recycled through hous-
ing improvement subsidies, an even higher devel-
opment tax would be required to achieve a given 
reduction in suburban sprawl. Note that equation 
(21) raises the possibility that the city boundary 
could  increase when revenues are recycled (or 
equivalently, that open space could decrease). 
Such a scenario may even be optimal relative to 
the lump sum return if the revenue-recycling ef-
fect W
R is substantially larger than the (in this 
case, negative) Pigouvian welfare effect W
P and 





This paper examines the welfare effects of devel-
opment taxes aimed at curbing sprawl in the pres-
ence of urban decline at the city core. A central 
theme of the paper is that there are potential ad-
ditional efficiency effects from introducing the 
development tax that come from feedbacks be-
tween urban decline and suburban sprawl, as well 
as the mechanism of recycling the revenues from 
the development tax. In particular, comparisons 
are made between two forms of revenue recy-
cling: using the revenues of development taxes to 
return them in a lump-sum fashion to all land-
owners, and using the revenues of the develop-
ment tax to finance a subsidy to improvements. 
  When the revenues from the development tax 
are returned lump-sum, two welfare channels 
emerge: the traditional Pigouvian welfare effect, 
corresponding to the net benefits from increasing 
open space, and the aggregate improvement ef-
fect, which represents the efficiency gain associ-
ated with the capitalization resulting from the 
mitigation of urban decline. When development 
tax revenues are recycled in the form of improve-
ment subsidies, an additional welfare channel 
emerges: the revenue-recycling effect, which is 
the additional welfare change arising from capi-
talization of subsidized improvements. As a result 
of the aggregate improvement effect and revenue-
recycling effect, the optimal development tax 
should be set higher than the Pigouvian level. In 
fact, when revenues are recycled as a subsidy for 
housing improvements, a positive development 
tax may still be justified even when household 
valuation of open space is negligible. 
  Importantly, feedbacks between anti-sprawl poli-
cies and urban decline can also affect the level of 
suburban sprawl. Achieving a given reduction in 
suburban sprawl requires a larger development 
tax than the case where these feedback effects are 
absent, and these feedback effects are exacerbated 
when revenues are recycled. In fact, suburban 
sprawl may even increase when revenues are re-
cycled. Policymakers interested in curbing sprawl 
should be mindful of these potential feedbacks in 
the urban system when setting anti-sprawl policy. 
  An important caveat of the framework devel-
oped in this paper deserves mention. While our 
theory suggests that population responds to a 
city’s amenities and disamenities, our framework 
ignores reverse causation. It overlooks the possi-
bility that urban amenities and disamenities are a 
consequence rather than a cause of the location of 
households within an urban economy. In recent 
work, Brueckner and Helsley (2011) develop a 
duocentric closed linear city model in which sub-
urban areas and the city core compete for mobile 
residents to show that market failures that reduce 
the cost of occupying suburban areas also reduce 
central-city housing prices leading to deficient 
levels of central-city reinvestment. As a result, 
blight reduction can be a beneficial byproduct of 
anti-sprawl policies to the extent that these poli-
cies shift population towards the city center, im-
proving maintenance incentives. Integrating the 
effects of our study with the effects found in 
Brueckner and Helsley (2011) into a unified frame-
work is certainly a productive direction for future 
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Appendix: Mathematical Derivations of Key 
Equations 
 
Deriving Equation (17) 
 
Consider a development tax τD with revenue re-
turned lump-sum g to all landowners. Total rents 
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From equation (10), the first-order conditions for 






















By setting (10) evaluated at  x x =  equal to the 
agricultural rent, we derive 
 
(A4)  () D a rx r −τ = . 
 
Differentiating the city total aggregated land value 
(A1) with respect to τD while taking into account 
(A2)–(A4) yields the efficiency effects of a lump-
sum development tax, expressed as equation (17). 
 
Deriving Equation (18) 
 
From (13) and (A4), the total derivative of  x  is 
given by 
(A5)   
         ( )( 2 ).
DD D D
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rearranging (A5) and solving yields equation (18). 
 
Deriving Equation (20) 
 
Consider a development tax τD with revenues re-
cycled as a subsidy g per unit of improvements. 
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Modifying equation (10), the first-order conditions 






















Differentiating the city total aggregated land value 
(A6) with respect to τD while taking into account 
(A4), (A7), and (A8) yields the efficiency effects 
of a development tax with revenues recycled into 
improvement subsidies, as expressed in equation 
(20). 
 
Deriving Equation (21) 
 
From (13) and (A4), the total derivative of  x  is 
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